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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE NEW RESPONSE TO DISASTERS

Natural disasters are an expected, albeit uncontrolled part of history, and will
continue and possibly worsen in the future. Communities have been able to rebuild
after devastating damages and fatal disasters through recovery and relief efforts
that have focused on what’s essential- survival and basic necessities. The
humanitarian focus that has characterized disaster response is changing, along with
the way the government responds to large-scale disasters.
Since there have been natural disasters, there has also been some sort of
disaster response, although initial responses to earthquakes, tornadoes and the like
resemble few aspects of disaster response today. Since the inception of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979, the role of the military has grown
more remarkable and substantial, almost to the point that we increasingly see the
military as first responders (Burby 2006, Hofmann and Hudson 2009, Mannion 2006,
Marek 2005).
A much newer phenomenon than military involvement is the focus on
security and crime, and one objective of this study is to show through literature that
1

this is true. In recent years, disaster response has been plagued with the perception
that looting and violent crimes commonly take place in the aftermath of a natural
disaster (Tierney et al, 2006), and that these security problems need to be addressed
first to keep society and neighborhoods that are affected safe. In fact, much of the
reason military personnel and troops are called upon now is to deal with threats to
security after a natural disaster, and this seems especially true for private military
companies that are contracted by the government. Securing neighborhoods and
attempting to quell criminal activity have taken precedent over getting victims of
natural disasters out of the area and to proper shelter with amenities they need.
This is a problematic trend in society today, where the failed responses on the part
of the government have meant private sector companies and individuals in
communities are expected to compensate for this lack of regard.
Current literature on the militarization of disaster relief focuses on the
expansion of powers of federal government, with a broader role for the military
because they have the manpower and resources to be of great assistance (Johnson
2004, Alvarez 2005, Fischer et al 2006). The supplies the military has at its disposal
are not overlooked when it comes to helping in times of disaster. The military has
always been involved to some extent, but only as support to local and state
authorities, as this is all the law will allow. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 has been
at odds with the reality of situations, as the military has not only been increasingly
2

used as responders, but used more as security detail. White House Reports on
Hurricane Katrina, sociological journals, and books ranging from Militarizing the
American Criminal Justice System (Kraska, 2001) to Acts of God (Steinberg, 2006) are
examples of sources used to accumulate information.
As has been the case in recent history, citizens often must bear the brunt of
losses from these natural disasters (Burby, 2006), which means disaster response in
the new millennium has a neoliberal slant that was previously nonexistent to
disaster recovery operations. Victims in communities that have been stricken by
hurricanes, tornadoes and other common natural disasters are expected to, for the
most part, not only fend for themselves but also cleaning up after and rebuilding
after the disaster.
This new liberalism is based on corporate autonomy, keeping businesses from
feeling negative impacts while a “free market” mentality is applied for individual
citizens (Steinberg, 2006). A prime example of neo-liberalism at work would be the
poor and underprivileged New Orleans citizens who had no way out of the city
before Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005. There were no plans in place to help with
evacuations, which is why many stayed behind.
All of the literature considered from different areas of interest builds a
foundation upon which theories and examples can be discussed. The aim was to
coordinate the information in a way that not only exemplifies that militarization of
3

disaster response is a real phenomenon, but also one that should be studied in
criminal justice because of the implications to our field of study. It has become clear
since the turn of the century that disaster response is no longer about helping
victims and recovery efforts, but about keeping people “safe” and minimizing the
risk of crime in what is considered an area in a disarray with no rule of law being
enforced.
Research will showcase a turn of events that has been taking place, and how
the concentration of disaster response is changing in our modern society as we
become ever more concerned with crime and keeping ourselves safe and out of
harm’s way. This mentality has paved the way for private military companies and
the military itself to get more involved in responding to natural disasters and gaining
more power in controlling the neighborhoods and people affected by unforeseen
catastrophes.
This research is exploring a phenomenon previously unexamined within the
field of criminal justice studies. Many have written extensively on the subjects of
disaster relief and militarization concepts within many disciplinary fields. Secondary
document analysis was undertaken using a wide variety of sources, including
government reports, peer reviewed journal articles, and newspapers and editorials.
The task undertaken in this research will be to synthesize as much relevant
information as could be attained in order to build a theoretical framework that can
4

help shed light on the militarization of disaster response and how it specifically
relates to crime, using Hurricane Katrina as a case study and example of the
phenomenon.

5

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

The primary methods used in this research are a secondary analysis of written
sources, as well as theoretical synthesis of information. The goal of this is to cite
instances and circumstances that prove the fact that disaster response has changed
to increasingly work from the military approach, and then theorize on why this has
happened and what it means for criminal justice.
Analytical techniques used were perusing the relevant literature by using
search engines and the database JSTOR. Various terms and words were used to
maximize the documents that could be found, including terms on “militarization”,
“disaster response”, “crime and Hurricane Katrina”, “disasters and crime”, and other
combinations. The articles that were found to be relevant were examined for
common themes or for precise examples to be used. It was also important to check
government websites, for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to gain basic
knowledge and understanding to be used so that a general overview of disaster
response could be provided.

6

As was mentioned, the theoretical section is included to answer the question
of why disaster response has become so much more focused on criminal behavior in
the aftermath of a catastrophe, and why the military has been used more as an
unofficial police force. It is important to understand not just that this is a new
phenomenon taking place and that it has significant meaning for the field of crime
and justice studies, but to consider why it is taking place now.

7

CHAPTER 3

THE HISTORY OF MILITARIZATION AND DISASTER RESPONSE

Defining the concepts of militarization and militarism is essential to seeing
how this has been taking place in the realm of disaster response. Militarization refers
to a means of implementing the ideology of militarism, but applying those elements
of the military to a different agency or situation (Kraska, 2001). Merriam-Webster
dictionary defines militarism as “predominance of the military class or its ideals”.
The focus on problems is shifted so that they are seen as easily amenable through
military efforts. The American public views the military as a problem solver that
succeed in any mission. They are perceived as efficient, orderly, and disciplined, and
the military itself is willing to keep up this image, as it makes them socially useful.
There are four indicators to look for with militarization- material, cultural,
organizational, and operational (Kraska, 2001). Material refers to weapons and
technology that might be used in responses. Cultural aspects are indicated by
language used to describe what has happened in militaristic terms. After Hurricane
Katrina, New Orleans was referenced in terms of restoring law and order.
Organizational would be how military arrangements are deployed., whether it be as
8

first responders, for support to civil authority, or for security purposes. Operational
is how the militant agencies and groups carry out their orders, as oftentimes the use
of force or threat of force is a method used. The ideology of the military is strong,
and the social environment must be open to accepting this.
As will be evidenced throughout this research, officials have long since been
calling for greater military intervention in disasters. The public view of the military as
saviors who help restore order and prevent disaster victims from causing crime is
common. This is what Chalmers Johnson (2004) refers to when he writes, “certainly
one of the clearest signs of militarism in America is the willingness of some senior
officers and civilian militarists to meddle in domestic policing”.
The authority of the federal government and the military in disaster response
used to follow traditional protocol (Anderson, 1970). There were role expectations
and norms to adhere to, and even when the military was called upon it was strictly in
support to civil authorities. They waited until they were invited to help, unless the
need was known and apparent, putting them under pressure to respond, which is
what the framers intended (Anderson 1970, Dunlap Jr.2001).
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 was passed with the direct intention of
limiting the ability of the federal government to use the military for law enforcement
purposes. It does not apply to the National Guard or Coast Guard (Trebilcock, 2000).,
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and the formality and strict separation has deteriorated over the years. When it
comes to natural disasters, Trebilcock (2000) writes:
Federal military personnel may also be used pursuant to the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C.,
section 5121, in times of natural disaster upon request from a state governor. In such an
instance, the Stafford Act permits the president to declare a major disaster and send in
military forces on an emergency basis for up to ten days to preserve life and property.
While the Stafford Act authority is still subject to the criteria of active versus passive, it
represents a significant exception to the Posse Comitatus Act’s underlying principle that
the military is not a domestic police force auxiliary.

Given the supposed lack of public order after Hurricane Katrina, President
Bush recommended revising this law so that the military could restore law and
order. These changes were implemented in the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. This gave the commander in chief the
authority to call on the armed forces to “restore public order and enforce laws of the
United States when, as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious
public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition... the
President determines that... domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that
the constituted authorities of the State or possession are incapable of maintaining
public order” (H.R. 5122, 2006). Although it has since been repealed (in 2008), this
alarming trend of using the military as police for security purposes after a natural
disaster, and passing laws to make this acceptable, has led to the expectation that
10

“disaster relief has become a core, but rarely acknowledged, mission of the United
States military” (Juul, 2010).
Previously in United States history, disaster relief has been primarily a local
and state issue, but has become increasingly more federalized over the years
(Buchalter, 2007). The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 and the Stafford Act
(amended from the 1988 Disaster Relief Act), both authorize federal authorities to
take action after a natural disaster strikes should the President feel he or she is
acting in the interests of saving human lives. Despite all of this, the military is still
only supposed to act in support to civil authorities, and traditionally have been called
in as such.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was an organization
created in 1979 specifically to coordinate disaster response when it was formally
requested by state governments. A regularized system of disaster relief had already
been implemented by the 1960s, due to massive natural disasters such as Hurricane
Betsy in 1965, Hurricane Carla in 1962, and the Alaskan Earthquake of 1964. The
Disaster Relief Act of 1974 established the process for presidential disaster
declarations (FEMA, 2011). When President Carter made the executive order in 1979
to merge and coordinate the fragmented disaster relief operations, and “civil
defense responsibilities were also transferred to the new agency from the Defense
Department’s Defense Civil Preparedness Agency” (FEMA, 2011). The influence of
11

militarism, then, has always been an inherent part of disaster response and disaster
response agencies.
The creation of FEMA was prompted by criticism of how the federal
government handled emergency management (Steinberg, 2006). Many early leaders
of the agency had military experience, including Director Louis Giuffrida, who
attended U.S. Army War College and served in the National Guard. During the next
decade, FEMA developed a plan under the guidance of Colonel Oliver North to
prevent nuclear attack on the United States. As Steinberg notes, “between 1982 and
1991, FEMA spent almost $3 billion developing equipment and plans for either
protecting government officials during nuclear war or dealing with other aspects of
national security. During the same time, it spent just $243 million on planning for
natural disaster.” This led to disconcerting and mediocre responses to natural
disasters such as Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina.
After Hurricane Andrew hit Florida in 1992, FEMA was strongly criticized for
its slow response to the disaster. This led to an effort by the federal government to
improve the agency, and give it a more definitive mission. President Clinton
nominated James L. Witt as the new director, the first one in FEMA’s 14-year history
who had experience as a state emergency manager. Resources were allocated
differently, from civil defense to preparedness and disaster relief and recovery
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operations (FEMA, 2011). All of this was sidelined, however, after the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001.
FEMA became refocused on issues of national security and preparedness
after 9/11. (FEMA, 2011). FEMA’s Office of National Preparedness trained first
responders to deal with weapons of mass destruction, billions of dollars were spent
on homeland security, and finally in March of 2003, FEMA became a part of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The main focus of the DHS since its creation has been national security and
terrorism, so natural disaster response preparedness efforts and mitigation plans
were superseded by counter terrorism as the new homeland security focused
organization developed plans based on terrorist disasters. Because all of the
agencies within the DHS were interconnected, monies could be easily transferred
from one to another, and FEMA began to lose funds. This made the agency less
capable of carrying out planning and preparation for natural disasters. The focus was
forced to change and concentrated only on relief efforts, which made FEMA seem to
some the equivalent of a “federal firehouse” (Cooper and Block, 2006).
FEMA being integrated with the Department of Homeland Security has been
viewed as problematic by disaster response analysts. Fischer, et al (2006),
commented, for example, that “while terrorism may occur again, we know
hurricanes and other types of disasters will.” It is also questionable, and reasonable
13

to wonder, on what has been accomplished by the serious focus on terrorism and
security. The planning and preparation for natural disasters has become inadequate,
and almost moot (Cooper and Block 2006, Gill 2007).
Even in the days after Hurricane Katrina, terrorism was still on the minds of
federal officials. A document from the DHS entitled “How Terrorists Might Exploit a
Hurricane” (2004) was circulated throughout federal agencies. This plan even noted
that it was unlikely that terrorism could be an issue during a natural disaster, but
went on to outline recommendations such as nationwide security and high security
levels at shelters that would include identification checks. Those who took part in
the Red Cell that organized this document included the U.S. Marine Corps -- another
indicator of militarization.
In 2002, United States Military Northern Command was established, which
serves as an on-call federal response for disasters, its mission to protect the
homeland. It officially serves as a support to civil authorities (limited by the Posse
Comitatus Act), but also states that in case of a national emergency, the Air Forces
Northern National Security Emergency Preparedness Directorate will gain control of
the situation. They will coordinate defense support and provide command and
control (Lendman, 2008).
The National Response Plan, adopted in 2004, was a document outlining
emergency response guidelines in the event of a catastrophic event. Although it was
14

not just focused on natural disasters, FEMA was not consulted in drawing up of this
plan. The Rand Corporation, a counterterrorism thinktank, was contracted for the
job. The government, in regards to disasters, was focused only on terrorism, not
the more likely to occur natural disasters.
The White House Report on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina,
released in February 2006, also mentioned national security and 9/11 numerous
times in the discussion on lessons learned from the natural disaster that leveled New
Orleans. Since terrorism was at the forefront of topics discussed in disaster
response, most funds were used for this purpose, making designing plans for
preparing and mitigating damage from natural disasters nearly impossible.
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CHAPTER 4

HURRICANE KATRINA: A CASE STUDY

On August 29, 2005, the role of the federal government in response to
natural disasters would face true scrutiny, and become one of the most inefficient
disaster responses in recent history. New Orleans was in the direct path of a
Category 5 hurricane, and completely unprepared for the havoc the storm would
unleash. Hurricane Katrina, and the subsequent governmental response in New
Orleans, will be used to exemplify the militarization of disaster response. There was
a marked difference in how relief operations were handled as compared to any
disaster before.
Three days before the hurricane made landfall, Louisiana governor Kathleen
Blanco declared a state of emergency. A federal emergency was declared a day
later, as Blanco asked President Bush to do so, stating:

I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that
effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local
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governments, and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save
lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the
threat of a disaster.

This gave the federal government, including FEMA and the Department of
Homeland Security, full authority in the disaster response to Hurricane Katrina. A
day before landfall, Mayor Ray Nagin declared a mandatory evacuation of New
Orleans. Unable to leave the city because they lacked transportation, roughly 30,000
citizens gathered at the Superdome. The Louisiana National Guard requested 700
buses from FEMA to help with evacuations, but only 100 were sent (O’Brian and
Bender, 2005). The next morning, Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a category 4
storm.
Reports of water overflowing the levees, and the possibility they had been
breeched, arose almost immediately. The devastation would remain to be seen at
this time, but officials were aware of the unavoidable possibilities. In 2004, FEMA
had funded and participated in a disaster simulation referred to as “Hurricane Pam”,
which warned of the desolation that could become New Orleans, a city that has a
vulnerable geographic landscape and lies below sea level. Poor communication on
whether or not the levees had actually broke hinted to poor preparedness for this
predicted catastrophe. The levees had in fact been breeched by late morning, as the
17

Times-Picayune reported, “A large section of the vital 17th Street Canal levee, where
it connects to the brand new ‘hurricane proof’ Old Hammond Highway bridge, gave
way late Monday morning in Bucktown after Katrina’s fiercest winds were well
north.”

Reports of crime and lawlessness surfaced almost immediately. The media
nationwide began reporting on riots and looting happening in the affected areas,
and alleging that citizens were being shot and raped, with gangs running around the
Superdome menacing people. Afterwards, it was revealed there were only eight
gunshot victims total in New Orleans during the Hurricane Katrina rescue effort, and
two of those were apparent suicides (Cooper and Block, 2006). As will be further
discussed, disaster literature notes that crime and looting after natural disasters are
rarely significant problems in the United States. Still, American citizens were on the
outside looking in, wondering why the federal government had not responded to the
crime issue earlier. The Associated Press reported that fights and fired had broken
out, corpses were laying out on the streets, and rescue helicopters and law
enforcement officers were shot at, turning the situation even more desperate.
Tierney and Bevc (2007) give an overview of how militarization began with the relief
efforts in Louisiana:
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In the response that followed the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, more than
63,000 National Guard and active military personnel were deployed to assist
in the response and recovery efforts of the Gulf region. Beyond routine tasks,
such as search and rescue and the delivery of relief supplies, military
personnel also operated outside their traditional areas of responsibility and
were armed with loaded weapons to deal with socially constructed threats of
urban insurgents and charged with restoring order. The Katrina catastrophe
provided the justification for U.S. leaders to push for the militarization of
disasters, even though the idea has many opponents and the rationales for
expanding the role of the military are questionable.

Thousands of fully armed troops, from the Coast Guard, National Guard, and
Marines, were present to guard the streets of New Orleans, with assault rifles and
hummers (Whitney 2005, Kouddous 2005). A 6 p.m. curfew was put into effect for all
citizens, and no re-entry was allowed for residents who might be trying to return to
the city, either to get belongings or search for loved ones. The Convention Center
and Superdome were heavily guarded and locked down, complete with military
checkpoints throughout the city (Scahill, 2005).
Hurricane Katrina became a launch for military operations against United
States citizens. It has since been illustrated through eyewitness reports that New
19

Orleans police officers were told they were allowed to shoot looters (Shankman and
Jennings, 2010). Ultimately, a total of eleven New Orleans residents were involved in
shootings by officers.
Aside from this, there was much confusion among law enforcement officials
as to how much force should be used to stop looting, some citing martial law, and
other refusing to adhere to the order. “Take back the city” and “regain control” were
phrases used repeatedly and without consequence. Sally Forman, communications
chief for Mayor Nagin, was quoted saying “The mayor said, ‘Let's stop the looting,
let's stop the lawlessness and let's put our police officers on the streets so that our
citizens are protected,” (Shankman and Jennings, 2010). Many journalists and
citizens were shocked to hear the order to shoot looters, especially since they posed
no immediate or dangerous threat to the safety of others (Joyner 2005, Shankman
and Jennings 2010).
Related to looting are disaster myths (Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski, 2006)
which frame social control and reactions from citizens. Classic disaster research
shows that there are lower instances of deviant behaviors than during nondisaster
time periods. The panic myth is a popularly held misconception about reactions
during times of disaster, which assumes the public will react with great alarm. The
authors mention Hurricane Katrina specifically, and how media coverage shifted
from exhibiting the devastation to characterizing the disaster victims “as
20

opportunistic looters and violent criminals.” New Orleans was referred to as a “war
zone, drawing parallels between the conditions in that city and urban insurgency in
Iraq.” What ensued was a military response based on the assumption that residents
in New Orleans were out of control, dangerous, and deviant.
Fischer noted a “looting frame” in disaster myths also (1998). It is a “most
expected behavioral response” in times of disaster, with the media reporting on
looting consistently. Troops are brought in to prevent these incidents and act as a
social control. Oftentimes, if looting is rampant, it is merely a means for survival,
with residents taking food and water, which is not being provided to them. The
social disorder that was commonly throught to plague New Orleans during this time
was a social construction, and many citizens “with homes, property, and livelihoods
gone, with no evidence of a functioning governmental system…without any idea of
when help would arrive…might have understandably concluded they had to fend for
themselves” (Tierney et al, 2006).
Beyond the scope of property damage and theft were the reports of violent
crimes. These stories of people robbing businesses and assaulting other disaster
victims was a “clear influence” on disaster management decision making. Accounts
of gunshot victims, rape of children, and gangs were proven groundless, but even
during hurricane relief efforts, Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin made safety from
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crime a priority, ordering officials to go after lawbreakers, disregarding the fact that
many victims were still stranded.
Some news headlines were more representative and accurate (Fischer et al,
2006): “No evidence shots fired at helicopters- post-Katrina rumor delayed rescue
actions in New Orleans” (Hill and Spangler 2005); “Now the real looting begins:
Purging the poor” (Klein 2005); and Exposed: Katrina urban legends- rumors of
murder, mayhem debunked” (Gillin 2005) are a few examples. Some have argued
that if shots ever were fired at aircrafts, it was only to draw attention to themselves
so they could be rescued. These exaggerated reports of crime delayed rescue
missions that were fearful to enter the city.
One cannot mention Hurricane Katrina without also noting the race factor.
Minorities are often portrayed in stereotypical ways, and this was true for New
Orleans. Black residents were labeled in captions as “looters” while white citizens
were looking for supplies. Similarities begin to surface also between New Orleans
post-Katrina and the American criminal justice system. Young black men are
disproportionately labeled as criminals and serve time in prison, creating a racial
stereotype that is carried out even through gatekeepers just as law enforcement.
The reaction to looters and resident of New Orleans (and the Ninth Ward
specifically) shows this same racial myth, justifying law enforcement tactics because
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of the threat to social order by “thugs” in the city (Niman 2005, Hartman and Squires
2006, Elliott and Pais 2006).
Given the concentration on criminal behavior and lawlessness and disorder,
the reaction that came afterwards under the guidance of the federal government
does not seem so surprising. Soon after this natural disaster, one of the worst in the
history of the United States, troops and private military personnel were called upon
to restore law and order. Private military companies (PMC’s), such as Blackwater,
were hired by the federal government, as well as business owners in New Orleans, to
protect property enforce rule of law. The focus was on providing surveillance and
ensuring that crime did not become an issue (Tierney 2007; Williams, 2008).
Private military companies, also sometimes referred to as mercenaries, are
hired contractors who provide security services. Many private business owners hired
PMC’s such as Israeli Defense Forces and Blackwater to guard property (Scahill,
2005). These companies “employ some of the most feared professional killers in the
world accustomed to operating without worry of legal consequences and largely off
the congressional radar” (Scahill, 2007). In an effort to avoid threatening the Posse
Comitatus Act, the federal government was able to hire these mercenaries to police
the streets of New Orleans as the military might do if they were able, their job being
to secure the neighborhoods and confront criminals. 164 Blackwater troops were
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hired directly by the Department of Homeland Security (Cooper and Block, 2006),
and others were hired privately as well.
This militarization of post-Katrina Louisiana was magnified by the fact that
just five days after the hurricane, the number of Guardsmen and active military
deployed tripled that of Hurricane Andrew (Tierney et al, 2006). Search and rescue
mission “began to resemble military search and destroy missions” and the region
was described as being similar to that of a war zone. After the military and police
gained control, evacuees were searched and patted down like criminals for weapons
and drugs. An army major general was quoted as saying, “once you put soldiers on
the streets with M16s, things tend to settle down” (Tierney et al 2006, Alvarez
2005). Special Forces were sent to New Orleans for the distinct purposes of security,
including a 300 person military police unit (Alvarez, 2005).
According to American Forces Information Service, the deployment of the
military in response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest for any natural disaster in
history (2005). DHS press secretary Russ Knocke was quoted as saying, “we could
have had the military, for instance, fly over New Orleans early on to help us gain
visibility on things- water levels and developing pockets of criminal activity” (Marek,
2005). Shortly after recovery operations began in New Orleans the president made it
clear that the challenges faced in confronting the response to this natural disaster
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“requires greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces” (Marek,
2005).
A Disaster Assistance report from the United States General Accountability
Office in 1993 foreshadowed what would happen over ten years later. The report
suggested that “the roles, training, and doctrine military forces employ during
disasters are similar to what they employ in performing their national security
missions” during wartime. In Florida during Hurricane Andrew, it is noted, the Guard
was primarily used to law enforcement, and reserves should be made more readily
available for response to disasters.
The Army Times reported in 2008 that the 3rd Infantry’s Brigade Combat
Team in Iraq would be “redeployed at home as an on-call federal response force for
natural or manmade emergencies and disasters” (Lendman, 2009). This goes along
with the militaristic thinking in society and the perception that the military “proved
to be the only federal entities capable of turning the president’s orders into prompt
action on the ground” (Mannion, 2006) after Hurricane Katrina. This not only
continues to improve the image of the military, but also provide training
opportunities (Hoffman and Hudson, 2009), as they can use disaster response
operations as practice for real deployment operations.
The White House Report on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina was
released in 2006, citing lessons learned from the ordeal. The natural disaster is
25

related to 9/11 numerous times, in reference to citizens expecting a more timely
response. Terrorism and national security are also mentioned ostensibly in the
report. Acts of terrorists and the wrath of nature are equated. A larger federal role in
contingency planning for catastrophes is suggested, even though the federal
government failed by all accounts.
Public safety and security is covered in the report, where is it written that
“most of the New Orleans police force was redirected from search and rescue
missions to respond to the looting, detracting from the priority mission of saving
lives”. This admission by the government that police forces blatantly stopped search
missions to deal with crime is momentous. Worthy of mentioning is how Hurricane
Katrina was said to “cripple” the nation’s criminal justice system, with offenders not
accounted for and on the lose. Criminal prosecutions were delayed and there was
poor recordkeeping. Contrary to what is now known about the societal reaction of
New Orleans, the White House report declares that “almost immediately following
Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, law and order began to deteriorate”. This is one of
many assumptions on the part of the federal government. Furthermore, the first
person federally arrested after Hurricane Katrina (as a suspect for shooting at
helicopters) is presumed guilty although the outcome is never divulged, and his
given statement not shared, so we are expected to assume this was another case of
deviant behavior in the disorderly neighborhoods.
26

Perhaps the most resounding recommendation is the most revealing- reestablish FEMA as an agency separate from the Department of Homeland Security
(Fischer, 2006). This would ensure money would be allocated for the agency, and
instead of focusing only on an immediate disaster security-based response, plans
could be organized for mitigation of damages from disasters and preparedness,
much like what happened after Hurricane Andrew (although that never fully came to
fruition).
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CHAPTER 5

THEORIZING ON WHY DISASTERS HAVE BECOME MILITARIZED
IN MODERN TIMES

It became evident after Hurricane Katrina that disaster response had taken
on a life of its own, and the military was a primary leader in relief efforts. All of this
was exemplified through the media and the response of the federal government,
through focusing on crime and security to hiring mercenaries. What happened after
Hurricane Katrina was at odds with disaster response protocol on not involving the
military in policing efforts, and coming to the aid of American citizens. Naturally the
most significant question to be asked is: why?
Society today has become much more concerned with security and avoiding
risk, assuming complete control is possible in our rapidly changing culture. This is
what is known as late modernity, and refers to the current era we are in. This
theoretical orientation will be used to explain, in part, why disaster response has
changed so drastically.

28

One perspective in understanding late modernity are the neo-liberal policies
the government is practicing today, which are embedded within disaster response as
well. FEMA has made it clear that victims of natural disasters in communities must
be prepared to be on their own for the first 72 hours (Fischer, 2006). The White
House report on Hurricane Katrina also mentions that the government alone cannot
deliver all disaster relief, and has a section entitled “Citizen Preparedness”, which
suggests that “civilians need to take responsibility for maximizing the probability
that they will survive, should disaster strike”. Many citizens in New Orleans,
however, lacked these means of survival. They did not have access to transportation
and the state did not have a contingency plan in place that would have mitigated
damages. After the worst was over and residents had been evacuated to nearby
states, they were left to fend for themselves still, relying instead on the graciousness
of the Red Cross, United Way, and other charitable organizations. Problems are still
rampant with FEMA claims and funding, with many not able to acquire enough to
sustain themselves for any proper length of time. Individualism was given high
priority during Hurricane Katrina, since the state had obviously failed, bringing neoliberalism to the limelight. Citizens are made to “bear the brunt of losses in disasters,
local public officials often fail to take actions necessary to protect them” (Burby,
2006). These burdens are not just physical and emotional, but financial.
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Two paradoxes that entail the burden of the individual are the safe
development paradox and the local government paradox (Burby, 2006). Safe
development means the federal government makes a certain locality safe to build on
and develop, which in turn makes them susceptible to disasters. Local government
comes into play as they give inadequate attention to threats of disaster, such as the
unwillingness in New Orleans to rebuild the levees. What results is catastrophe, and
even though the government did nothing to prevent or alleviate damages, they also
do nothing to amend any situation, leaving citizens like those of the lower ninth
ward in New Orleans without homes and no property or belongings left to claim.
In situations of high uncertainty, “organizations deploy science and
technology in combination with a misplaced faith in their capabilities so as to
redefine risks as more manageable and acceptable” (Williams, 2008). What we are
left with are manufactured risks, making natural disasters seem controllable. The
focus is shifted from the fury of nature to the fury of man. Concentrations were on
“providing surveillance and protective equipment” (Tierney 2006). Accusations were
rampant about looting when family members were simply searching for loved ones,
and people were refused permission to leave the shelters, for fear letting them out
on their own would result in more crime and chaos.
Environmental matters are relegated secondary to social issues, even though
natural disasters are not preventable, as “complex systems involve much uncertainty
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and the unknown while the stakes are very high” (Williams 2008). This is what
instills fear in late modern society. Many practices are based on pre-modern notions
of society, but modern society reacts differently, and an actuarial society rises. An
emphasis is placed on “efficiency, minimizing risk, targeting hot-spots of potential
danger, and prevention” (Kraska, 2004). In late modern society, we want the world
to be as safe, secure, and predictable as possible, all within a “socially exclusive
society”. Populations are so consumed with avoiding danger and minimizing risk,
that “those members of society that pose a potential danger are the excluded
‘other’” (Kraska, 2004).
This all explains why the reaction to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans
happened. When a natural disaster such as a hurricane strikes, it causes a panic
because no one knows what to expect- the outcome is unknown and above all no
one can tell when help will arrive, and in what form. Since we are already a risk
aversive society, fearful of the unknown, sometimes we allow liberties to become
eroded in exchange for a feeling of safety. After a natural disaster, the feeling of
uncertainty is magnified. Because society will go to extremes in terms of safety and
security, allowing military personnel to get involved in disaster response seems
acceptable, especially when it comes to dealing with crime. There are already so
many unforeseen problems with housing, transportation, food and water supplies,
that there will be zero tolerance for criminal activity.
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The residents of New Orleans who were left behind to fend for themselves in
the hurricane were the “other”, and because the risk was so great, the response was
great. The military not only became involved, but became a primary actor. Law
enforcement officers acted militarily as well, obeying shoot to kill order against
looters. The stories of horrific violence and a community in a disarray were
misrepresented because fear was heightened, and in order to minimize the risk on
everyone else in surrounding communities, extreme security measure were taken
against those left behind, while basic relief efforts were neglected.
Jonathan Simon (2007) writes of a notion he calls governing through crime,
which essentially means that problems in society are defined through how crime is
dealt with. Consistently since the 1960’s (when the period of late modernity began)
crime control is the most important matter. This has always been an efficient
strategy for lawmakers and leaders, to tell the public they are going to get tough on
crime. When it comes to natural disasters it does not seem as appropriate, given the
other more pertinent problems such as amenities for survival, but that is what has
been happening. The response to Hurricane Katrina exemplifies how crime was used
as a first response by the government. Almost immediately, residents were on
lockdown in the Superdome, troops were called in, and within a day reports of
looting and heinous crimes were spreading through the news circuit. The federal
government is breeding a society of “eager consumers of public and private
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governmental tools against crime risk” (Simon, 2007). Communities will welcome
military troops, law enforcement officers, National Guard, and private military
companies into their neighborhoods after a natural disaster because it means they
are protected.
Naturally, what happened after Hurricane Katrina did not come about
unexpectedly or suddenly. The military has always been a part of disaster response,
simply taking it a few steps further to become the predominant force in attempts to
quell criminal activity. The time is also right for the public to be accepting of this. Our
heightened fears about uncertainty and risk have led us to take drastic measures in
the name of security and safety. We will allow the military into our backyards with
assault rifles if it means we no longer feel we have to worry about hazards or
unforeseen dangers. The irony of this when it comes to natural disasters is that they
are almost always unforeseen dangers. A hurricane can change its path at any
moment; a tornado drops out of the sky with little warning; and wildfires spread
with the wind. Entrusting armed troops and mercenaries with our safety seems
more haphazard than risk aversive.
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CHAPTER 6

LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION

This research began as an exploratory study of militarizing all disasters.
However, natural and man-made disasters combined make up a large body of
literature, one that could never have been examined with care given the time frame,
which is why natural disasters became the focal point. One limitation is not being
able to include other man-made disasters such as oil spills, as these kinds of
disasters also illustrate the points made in this research.
Also limiting to this research is the fact that one example was used- Hurricane
Katrina. This decision was made because this natural disaster embodied all of the
marked changes that had taken place within disaster response, and showed how
drastic militarization of disasters could take place. It is certainly not the lone natural
disaster to involve the military, but it is one of the most memorable of recent
history. Further research could certainly focus on other types of natural disasters,
such as wildfires or tornado outbreaks.
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Militarization of natural disaster response in the United State is a very real
phenomenon, and one those involved in the study of criminal justice should pay
attention to, as the primary reason the military has been involved is for policing and
security. The perception of crime by the public and media, and the reliance on the
federal government and military to safeguard society in these areas struck by natural
disasters is of consequence. Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic disaster not only
because of the Category 5 storm that broke levees and killed thousands, but because
the response was uncoordinated and unfocused on what should have matteredsaving human lives. The federal government and state and local officials have long
ago admitted recovery operations were halted to deal with responses to crime. The
focus on security and criminal behavior in a time of emergency is unnatural,
happening only because late modern society has expectations and will not tolerate
even the supposed threat to safety. Disaster response in the United States will
remain forever changed by what happened in New Orleans, and the role of the
military shows no signs of stopping expansion into the realm of disaster relief.
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